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作者：DILLEN, M
摘要：This paper shows how we can correct market failure due to imperfect competition by using taxes and subsidies. The analysis is carried out at the general equilibrium level and the importance of objective demand curves is stressed. The main conclusions are: first, it is possible to tax the economy back to the Walrasian equilibrium by using linear taxes and subsidies; second, the welfare theorem holds in an imperfectly competitive economy with corrective taxes and subsidies; third, a competitive ...
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作者：ZODROW, GR
摘要：Several observers have concluded that the equivalence between the cash flow and wage tax approaches to direct consumption taxation breaks down in the presence of uncertainty, as individuals with extraordinarily large gains are treated too generously under the latter approach. In particular, Ahsan (Journal of Public Economics, 1989, 40, 99-134; Canadian Journal of Economics, 1990, 23, 408-433) contends that equivalence obtains only if returns in excess of a safe rate of return are included in t...
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作者：NOISET, L; OAKLAND, W
作者单位：Tulane University; United States Department of the Treasury
摘要：This paper examines the properties of capital taxation within a metropolitan environment. It is demonstrated that when the boundaries of the central city jurisdiction fail to incorporate the entire metropolitan community, the central city can redistribute wealth from suburban land-owners to its residents. In effect, the central city can exploit its suburbs. It does so through capital tax or subsidy policies which reduce employment opportunities in the metropolis. Hence, central city fiscal pol...
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作者：AUSTIN, DA
摘要：This paper investigates threats of coordinated exit (secession) when coalitions cannot choose their members by exclusion. This is modeled by a three-stage noncooperative game in which voters choose a proportional tax rate and the level of public services, and may choose to exit jointly. A modified Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash concept is applied to rule out dynamically inconsistent threats and behavior by coalitions that is not self-enforcing. The major result is that cooption of potential se...
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作者：OREILLY, T
摘要：Bradford and Hildebrandt show that under certain conditions preferences for public goods can be inferred from the demand for complementary private goods. They conjecture that their method overcomes consumers' incentives to misrepresent their public goods preferences, but this paper shows that in general this is not the case.
