COORDINATED ACTION IN LOCAL PUBLIC-GOODS MODELS - THE CASE OF SECESSION WITHOUT EXCLUSION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: AUSTIN, DA
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01478-K
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 235-256
• 关键词: SECESSION; Local public goods; perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; CLUB THEORY

摘要

This paper investigates threats of coordinated exit (secession) when coalitions cannot choose their members by exclusion. This is modeled by a three-stage noncooperative game in which voters choose a proportional tax rate and the level of public services, and may choose to exit jointly. A modified Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash concept is applied to rule out dynamically inconsistent threats and behavior by coalitions that is not self-enforcing. The major result is that cooption of potential seceding coalitions will not occur. This result relies on the assumption that seceding coalitions cannot exclude potential members.