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作者：CHAKRAVORTI, B
摘要：We study dynamic procedures for the provision of an efficient level of a public good with time-dependent surplus distribution. In general, such procedures are prone to manipulation via pre-play communication among coalitions of agents. We begin with a generalization of Truchon's (Econometrica, 1984, 52, 1179-1190) elegant non-myopic MDP procedure and provide a new procedure that exhibits finite, monotone convergence to Pareto-efficiency in Subgame-Perfect Coalition-proof equilibrium. This proc...
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作者：LOCKWOOD, B
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper considers a problem of multi-firm regulation where the regulator cannot make monetary transfers to or from firms. Otherwise, the set-up is standard; two firms charging two-part tariffs sell in separate markets, and marginal costs are private information. Without transfers, the regulator faces an additional consumer participation constraint that the representative consumer must wish to participate in the market in all states. The paper studies the second-best optimal regulatory schem...
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作者：JOHN, A; PECCHENINO, R; SCHIMMELPFENNIG, D; SCHREFT, S
作者单位：Michigan State University; United States Department of Agriculture (USDA); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：Actions that affect environmental quality both influence and respond to macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, many environmental and macroeconomic consequences of current actions will have uncompensated effects that outlive the actors. This paper presents an overlapping-generations model of environmental externalities and capital accumulation. Policies pursued by short-lived governments that affect capital accumulation and environmental quality, although myopically optimal, fail to internalize...
