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作者：Gawande, K
摘要：The endogenous theory of protection is empirically investigated in a different light. Rather than emphasizing the determinants of the supply of protection, the present study empirically investigates the micro-level demand side behavior of firms. Predictions from Bergstrom et al. (Journal of Public Economics, 1986, 2, 25-49) about the private provision of public goods provide a theoretical foundation for such a demand-side econometric investigation. If rational lobbies are observed to behave in...
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作者：Glazer, A; Niskanen, E
摘要：Governmental facilities for such services as education, health, and transportation are often small, of poor quality, and overcrowded, even when the costs are spread among all taxpayers. We also find that governments may subsidize private facilities providing the same services, or may charge admission fees at public facilities. We explain these phenomena with a model which considers two types of people, rich and poor. A majority consisting of poor people may purposely build small and low qualit...
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作者：Burlando, R; Hey, JD
作者单位：University of York - UK; University of Turin
摘要：We report on experiments replicating the Partners and Strangers design and we find some evidence that may help to accommodate previous diverging partners/strangers results. This finding comes out of a preliminary investigation into whether nationality makes a difference as far as free-riding is concerned. We seem to have identified a strong effect on behaviour resulting from national differences (which, in turn, presumably reflect cultural and sociological differences between subject groups), ...
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作者：Gruber, J; Kubik, JD
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We investigate the effects of trying to mitigate moral hazard in the Disability Insurance (DI) program by raising the stringency of the screening process for applicants, We do so by studying a dramatic increase in rejection rates for the DI program in the late 1970s, which varied substantially across the US states. We find that each 10% rise in denial rates led to a statistically significant 2.8% fall in labor force non-participation among 45-64 year old males. We also find that the denial rat...
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作者：Barham, V; Boadway, R; Marchand, M; Pestieau, P
作者单位：University of Ottawa; Queens University Belfast; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Liege
摘要：The non-cooperative provision of public goods is analyzed in the context of a two-stage game in which club size is determined endogenously. Equilibrium club size and voluntary labour supply are shown to be inefficient. The impact of optimally-chosen fiscal policies using simple instruments is studied. When agents do not derive non-pecuniary benefits from volunteer work, lump-sum grants can be used to implement the first-best equal treatment allocation but private provision is fully crowded out...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Brekke, KA
摘要：The choice of numeraire is shown to be important in cost-benefit analysis. When a public good is involved, individual consumers' marginal rates of substitution will generally differ. Thus, the less valuable the numeraire is to a person, the higher the number required to express his net benefit, and the more will his interest weigh in the total sum. The choice of money as numeraire is systematically favourable to those who value money the least, relative to alternative numeraires. (C)1997 Elsev...
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作者：Chiu, WH
摘要：We show that, given the close linkage between the health insurance and the health care industries as well as other special characteristics of conventional health insurance, the introduction of conventional health insurance will reduce consumers' welfare if the supply of health care is sufficiently price-inelastic.
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作者：Hercowitz, Z; Pines, D
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：This paper investigates the distribution of a population group between a home country and diaspora, given sequential decision-making regarding migration at the individual level. The home country is attractive to the members of the group, yet their presence there requires a fixed amount of public spending (e.g., on defense). The per-capita tax burden depends then on the size of the domestic population, reflecting a case of ''fiscal externality''. This results in an inefficient distribution of t...
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作者：Cremer, H; Marchand, M; Pestieau, P
作者单位：University of Liege; Universite de Toulouse
摘要：Within a two-community setting, we study the optimal provision of a local public good which is indivisible and generates interjurisdictional spillovers. Each community has to decide whether or not to invest in this public good, The resulting Nash equilibrium is compared with an optimal solution based on a Benthamian welfare function, We then analyze to what extent conditional grants are able to restore optimality when needed. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.
