Investment in local public services: Nash equilibrium and social optimum
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cremer, H; Marchand, M; Pestieau, P
署名单位：
University of Liege; Universite de Toulouse
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00004-2
发表日期：
1997
页码：
23-35
关键词：
摘要：
Within a two-community setting, we study the optimal provision of a local public good which is indivisible and generates interjurisdictional spillovers. Each community has to decide whether or not to invest in this public good, The resulting Nash equilibrium is compared with an optimal solution based on a Benthamian welfare function, We then analyze to what extent conditional grants are able to restore optimality when needed. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.
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