Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Barham, V; Boadway, R; Marchand, M; Pestieau, P
署名单位：
University of Ottawa; Queens University Belfast; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Liege
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00003-0
发表日期：
1997
页码：
9-22
关键词：
摘要：
The non-cooperative provision of public goods is analyzed in the context of a two-stage game in which club size is determined endogenously. Equilibrium club size and voluntary labour supply are shown to be inefficient. The impact of optimally-chosen fiscal policies using simple instruments is studied. When agents do not derive non-pecuniary benefits from volunteer work, lump-sum grants can be used to implement the first-best equal treatment allocation but private provision is fully crowded out. Otherwise, it is found that simple fiscal instruments cannot implement the first-best equal-treatment allocation unless club size is directly regulated.
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