Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Warneryd, K
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00020-6
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 435-450
• 关键词: FEDERALISM; contests; rent seeking; political integration; centralization

摘要

This paper explores the endogenous formation of jurisdictions, assuming the political process is a costly fight to acquire shares of the GNP pie. In such a setting, the stability of a unified jurisdiction is not necessarily determined by the preferences of the richest member region. We also show that a system of federalism is especially significant in ameliorating distributional competition and conflict. Less resources are spent in aggregate on appropriative activities under a hierarchical system of federalism than in a unified jurisdiction with a single central government. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.