Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haufler, A; Schjelderup, G
• 署名单位: University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00184-6
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 577-600
• 关键词: Commodity taxation; dynamic price competition

摘要

The paper employs a model of dynamic price competition to study how international commodity taxation affects the stability of collusive agreements when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into each other's home market. We consider both the choice of international tax principle and the harmonization of tax rates and differentiate between a setting where production costs differ between countries, and a setting where exogenous tax rate differentials are the only asymmetry. The conclusions derived from this model differ strongly from those obtained under the assumption of competitive product markets. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.