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作者：Duggan, M
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：State governments contract with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to coordinate medical care for nearly 20 million Medicaid recipients. Identifying the causal effect of HMO enrollment on government spending and health care quality is difficult if, as is often the case, recipients have the option to enroll in a plan. To estimate the average effect of HMO enrollment, this paper exploits county-level mandates introduced during the last several years in the state of California that required ...
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作者：Suurmond, G; Swank, OH; Visser, B
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Leiden University; Leiden University - Excl LUMC
摘要：Can reputational concerns do any good? Economists have shown how they lead agents to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how they may be a social blessing, An agent may exert effort to become informed about the uncertain benefits of a project. A smart agent's efforts make him better informed; a dumb agent's efforts are to no avail. If an agent does not know his type, reptuational concerns are socially beneficial. If an agent knows his type, reputa...
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作者：Bilodeau, M; Childs, J; Mestelman, S
作者单位：McMaster University; University of New Brunswick; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis
摘要：In some public goods environments it may be advantageous for heterogeneous groups to be coordinated by a single individual. This volunteer will bear private costs for acting as the leader while enabling each member of the group to achieve maximum potential gains. This environment is modeled as a War of Attrition game in which everyone can wait for someone else to volunteer. Since these games generally have multiple Nash equilibria but a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, we tested experimenta...
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作者：Desai, MA; Foley, CF; Hines, JR Jr
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Governments impose multiple taxes on foreign investors, though studies of the effect of tax policy on the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) focus almost exclusively on corporate income taxes. This paper examines the impact of indirect (non-income) taxes on FDI by American multinational firms, using affiliate-level data that permit the introduction of controls for parent companies and affiliate industries. Indirect tax burdens significantly exceed the foreign income tax obligations of...
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作者：Raff, H
作者单位：University of Kiel
摘要：This paper examines how free-trade agreements and customs unions affect the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) and social welfare, taking into account that governments may adjust taxes and external tariffs to compete for FDI. Conditions are identified under which a free-trade agreement leads to FDI and under which this improves welfare. The welfare effect is shown to depend on the relative size of efficiency gains in production and government revenue losses due to tax competition. A f...
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作者：Aizer, A; Currie, J
作者单位：Brown University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This study focuses on network effects in the utilization of publicly-funded prenatal care using Vital Statistics data from California for 1989-2000. Networks are defined using 5-digit zip codes and a woman's racial or ethnic group. Like others, we find evidence that the use of public programs is highly correlated within groups defined using race/ethnicity and neighborhoods. These correlations persist even when we control for many unobserved characteristics by including zip code-year fixed effe...
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作者：Bernhardt, D; Dubey, S; Hughson, E
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We develop a dynamic model of democratic politics in which both potential office holders and the electorate have heterogeneous ideologies. Voters have incomplete information about candidate ideologies, so they must use information from previous positions taken in office to make informed re-election decisions. We characterize the effects of term limits on the evolution over time of the ideological positions taken by office holders and derive the implications for voter choice and welfare. Contri...
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作者：Lalive, R; Zweimüller, J
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：The potential duration of benefits is generally viewed as an important determinant of unemployment duration. This paper evaluates a unique policy change that prolonged entitlement to regular unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to a maximum of 209 weeks for elderly individuals in certain regions of Austria. in the evaluation, we explicitly account for the fact that the program was an endogenous policy response to deteriorating labor market conditions for older workers in certain regions and sec...
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作者：Zhang, XB; Fan, SG; Zhang, LX; Huang, JK
作者单位：CGIAR; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); Chinese Academy of Sciences
摘要：In developing countries, identifying the most effective community-level governance mode is a key issue in rural development; therefore, empirical evaluation of these different modes is desperately needed. Since the 1980s, tens of thousands of villages in rural China have held local government elections, providing a good opportunity to investigate the effect of democratization on the level of public goods provision. Using a recent village survey conducted over a significant period of time, this...
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作者：Nyborg, K; Telle, K
作者单位：Statistics Norway
摘要：Regulatory agencies frequently present violators with warnings, not pursuing prosecution if the violation ceases upon receipt of the warning. We show how such warnings may help regulators to keep control: Prosecution is costly for the regulator, and insufficient prosecution efforts yield low penalties. Thus, with a limited regulatory budget, threats of harsh sanctions are credible only if the number of violators is low. This produces multiple Nash equilibria. If firms may make mistakes, the ec...
