Volunteering a public service: an experimental investigation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bilodeau, M; Childs, J; Mestelman, S
• 署名单位: McMaster University; University of New Brunswick; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.02.001
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 2839-2855
• 关键词: public good; best-shot; subgame-perfection; experiments

摘要

In some public goods environments it may be advantageous for heterogeneous groups to be coordinated by a single individual. This volunteer will bear private costs for acting as the leader while enabling each member of the group to achieve maximum potential gains. This environment is modeled as a War of Attrition game in which everyone can wait for someone else to volunteer. Since these games generally have multiple Nash equilibria but a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, we tested experimentally the predictive power of the subgame-perfection criterion. Our data contradict that subjects saw the subgame-perfect strategy combination as the obvious way to play the game. An alternative behavioral hypothesis-that subjects were unable to predict accurately how their opponents would play and tried to maximize their expected payoff-is proposed. This hypothesis fits the observed data generally well. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.