On the bad reputation of reputational concerns

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Suurmond, G; Swank, OH; Visser, B
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Leiden University; Leiden University - Excl LUMC
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.10.004
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 2817-2838
• 关键词: Reputation; information collection; 'Dumb'

摘要

Can reputational concerns do any good? Economists have shown how they lead agents to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how they may be a social blessing, An agent may exert effort to become informed about the uncertain benefits of a project. A smart agent's efforts make him better informed; a dumb agent's efforts are to no avail. If an agent does not know his type, reptuational concerns are socially beneficial. If an agent knows his type, reputational concerns may be socially beneficial. A dumb agent takes inefficient, unconventional decisions to mimic a smart agent. The latter exerts more effort in order not to be mistaken for a dumb. This holds whether or not project rejection is a safe haven for the dumb. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.