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作者：Auriol, E; Warlters, M
摘要：Informal sectors are larger in developing countries than in rich countries. This is a result of higher fixed costs of entry into the formal economy in developing countries. We show that raising barriers to entry is consistent with a deliberate government policy for raising tax revenue. By generating market power, and hence rents, for the permitted entrants, market entry fees foster the emergence of large taxpayers. The rents can be readily confiscated by the government through entry fees and t...
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作者：Kanbur, R; Keen, M
作者单位：Cornell University; International Monetary Fund
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作者：Adam, CS; Bevan, DL
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper examines the relation between fiscal deficits and growth for a panel of 45 developing countries. Based on a consistent treatment of the government budget constraint, it finds evidence of a threshold effect at a level of the deficit around 1.5% of GDP. While there appears to be a growth payoff to reducing deficits to this level, this effect disappears or reverses itself for further fiscal contraction. The magnitude of this payoff, but not its general character, necessarily depends on...
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作者：Gersovitz, M; Hammer, JS
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; The World Bank
摘要：Vector-borne diseases especially rife in poor countries pose sectoral tax/subsidy issues. Preventions and therapies mitigate these diseases in a numerical optimization model combining dynamic epidemiology and economics. The medical distinction between prevention and therapy does not distinguish economic properties of preventions and therapies. Some interventions increase and others decrease moving to the steady state, depending: on the utility function, the targeting of interventions and the d...
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作者：Emran, MS; Stiglitz, JE
作者单位：George Washington University; George Washington University; Columbia University; Columbia University
摘要：The current consensus on indirect tax reform in developing countries favors a reduction in trade taxes with an increase in VAT to raise revenue. The theoretical results on selective reform that underlie this consensus are, however, derived from partial models that ignore the existence of an informal economy. Once the incomplete coverage of VAT due to an informal economy is acknowledged, we show that, contrary to the current consensus, the standard revenue-neutral selective reform of trade taxe...
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作者：Bardhan, P; Mookherjee, D
作者单位：Boston University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study the effects on accountability in government service delivery of decentralizing administration of an antipoverty program. While governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to antipoor policy biases owing to political capture, centralized delivery systems are additionally prone to bureaucratic corruption, owing to problems in monitoring bureaucratic performance. Decentralizing the delivery system promotes cost-effectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low pro...
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作者：Galasso, E; Ravallion, M
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：Developing country governments often delegate authority over the targeting of antipoverty programs to community organizations, while retaining control over how much goes to each community. We offer a theoretical characterization of the information structure in such programs and the interconnected behavior of the various players. Our model motivates an econometric specification for explaining distributional outcomes. Results for Bangladesh's Food-for-Education (FFE) Program indicate that within...
