Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Bardhan, P; Mookherjee, D
• 署名单位: Boston University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubcco.2003.01.001
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 675-704
• 关键词: Bureaucracy; CORRUPTION; decentralization; poverty alleviation; targeting

摘要

We study the effects on accountability in government service delivery of decentralizing administration of an antipoverty program. While governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to antipoor policy biases owing to political capture, centralized delivery systems are additionally prone to bureaucratic corruption, owing to problems in monitoring bureaucratic performance. Decentralizing the delivery system promotes cost-effectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low program scales. But interregional targeting may deteriorate, as central grants to high-poverty regions shrink, owing to high capture of local governments by local elites in such regions. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.