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作者：Bucovetsky, S
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：Public investment in infrastructure may help create agglomeration economics, by attracting mobile factors such as skilled labour. Competition among regions in public investment can then be destructive. This paper analyzes the Nash equilibria to a simple model of public input competition. Even though the regions are assumed identical, the equilibrium may not be symmetric. The problem with non-cooperative behaviour is not (only) that regions invest too much, but that too many regions may choose ...
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作者：Fullerton, D; Wolverton, A
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; United States Environmental Protection Agency
摘要：Standard Pigovian tax theory has been extended in two directions. First, many polluting activities are difficult to tax because they are not market transactions, and so recent papers have shown that the same effects can be achieved by use of a two-part instrument (2PI): a tax on output or income and a subsidy for clean alternatives to pollution. It is a generalization of a deposit-refund system (DRS). Second, a different literature concerns the second-best pollution tax in the presence of othe...
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作者：Aura, S
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
摘要：This paper studies within-family decision making regarding investment in income protection for surviving spouses using a simple and tractable Nash-bargaining model. A change in US pension law (the Retirement Equity Act of 1984) is used as an instrument to derive predictions from the bargaining model about the household demand for survivor annuities and life insurance and to contrast these with the predictions of the classical single-utility-function model of the household. In the empirical par...
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作者：Jin, HH; Qian, YY; Weingast, BR
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University; Stanford University; Stanford University
摘要：Aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies. Using a panel data set from China, we investigate the relationship between provincial government's fiscal incentives and provincial market development. We report three empirical findings. First, we find that during the period of fiscal contracting system the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small, suggesting that the f...
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作者：Johansson, P; Palme, M
作者单位：Uppsala University; Stockholm University
摘要：We study if the replacement level in the Swedish national sickness insurance, which replaces foregone earnings due to temporary illnesses, affects work absence behavior. We use micro data and estimate the effects of a major reform, whereby the replacement level during the first 90 days in each absence spell was reduced, on work attendance. To separate out the effect of the reform from any trend in work absence, we distinguish between the implications on the incidence of work absence (i.e., the...
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作者：Fuest, C
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：This paper analyses the impact of economic integration on tax policy in a model where corporate taxation is motivated by the desire to tax profits accruing to foreigners and the number of foreign owned firms is endogenous. Increasing economic integration is modeled as a decline in trade costs or tariffs. It turns out that declining trade costs lead to increasing profit taxes if the government may use import tariffs. If tariffs are not available, declining trade costs induce profit taxes to dec...
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作者：Li, HB; Zhou, LA
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Peking University
摘要：In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnel control in post-reform China. Employing the turnover data of top provincial leaders in China between 1979 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders increases with their economic performance, while the likelihood of termination decreases with their economic performance. This finding is robust to various sensitivity tests. We also find that the turnover of provincial leaders is more sen...
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作者：Niepelt, D
作者单位：Stockholm University; Study Center Gerzensee
摘要：Standard models of tax evasion implicitly assume that evasion is either fully detected, or not detected at all. Empirically, this is not the case, casting into doubt the traditional rationales for interior evasion choices. I propose two alternative, dynamic explanations for interior tax evasion rates: First, fines increasing in the duration of an evasion spell, implying that the expected costs of evasion increase convexly with the time spent non-reporting, while the benefits increase linearly....
