The two-part instrument in a second-best world

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fullerton, D; Wolverton, A
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; United States Environmental Protection Agency
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.06.011
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1961-1975
• 关键词: two-part instrument; deposit-refund system; tax-subsidy

摘要

Standard Pigovian tax theory has been extended in two directions. First, many polluting activities are difficult to tax because they are not market transactions, and so recent papers have shown that the same effects can be achieved by use of a two-part instrument (2PI): a tax on output or income and a subsidy for clean alternatives to pollution. It is a generalization of a deposit-refund system (DRS). Second, a different literature concerns the second-best pollution tax in the presence of other tax distortions. Here, we combine the two extensions by looking at the second-best 2PI. When government needs revenue, is the deposit larger and the rebate smaller? We find explicit solutions for each tax and subsidy in a general equilibrium model with other tax distortions, and we compare these to the rates in a first-best model. The tax-subsidy combination is explained in terms of a tax effect, an environmental effect and a revenue effect. The model allows for flexible interpretation to show various applications of the 2PI. We also discuss important caveats. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.