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作者：Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study the consequences of leniency-reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers-on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that-when not properly designed-leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions tha...
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作者：Buettner, Thiess; Wildasin, David E.
作者单位：University of Kentucky; University of Munich
摘要：The dynamic fiscal policy adjustment of local jurisdictions is investigated empirically using a panel of more than 1000 U.S. municipalities over a quarter of a century. Distinguishing own-source revenue, grants, expenditures, and debt service, the analysis is carried out using a vector error-correction model which takes account of the intertemporal budget constraint. The results indicate that a large part of the adjustment in response to fiscal imbalances takes place by offsetting changes in f...
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作者：Brueckner, Jan K.; Selod, Harris
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; INRAE; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：This paper analyzes the political economy of transport-system choice, with the goal of gaining an understanding of the forces involved in this important urban public policy decision. Transport systems pose a continuous trade-off between time and money cost, so that a city can choose a fast system with a high money cost per mile or a slower, cheaper system. The paper compares the socially optimal transport system to the one chosen under the voting process, focusing on both homogeneous and heter...
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作者：McBride, M
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：A discrete public good is provided when total contributions exceed the contribution threshold, yet the threshold is often not known with certainty. I show that the relationship between the degree of threshold uncertainty and equilibrium contributions and welfare is not monotonic. For a large class of threshold probability distributions, equilibrium contributions will be higher under increased uncertainty (e.g., a mean-preserving spread) if the public good's value is sufficiently high. Otherwis...
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作者：Glaeser, EL; Saks, RE
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the U.S. to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption. More educated states, and to a smaller degree richer states, have less corruption. This relationship holds even when we use historical factors like Congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for the level of schooling today. The level of corruption is also correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization, and uncorrelated with the size of governme...
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作者：Brown, Jeffrey R.; Liang, Nellie; Weisbenner, Scott
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA
摘要：This paper tests for important determinants of why some employers provide matching contributions for 401(k) plans in company stock. We find that firms that match in company stock have lower stock price volatility and lower bankruptcy risk and are also more likely to offer a defined benefit plan, consistent with a recognition that imposing a concentrated portfolio can be costly for employees. Evidence also indicates that firms match with company stock to help deter takeovers by putting stock in...
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作者：Lee, Woojin; Roemer, John E.
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：The two main political parties in the United States in the period 1976-1992 put forth policies on redistribution and on issues pertaining directly to race. We argue that redistributive politics in the US can be fully understood only by taking account of the interconnection between these issues in political competition. We identify two mechanisms through which racism among American voters decreases the degree of redistribution that would otherwise obtain. In common with others, we suggest that ...
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作者：Cadot, Olivier; Roeller, Lars-Hendrik; Stephan, Andreas
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; INSEAD Business School; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung
摘要：This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in production-function estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy. Our empirical findings on a panel of France's regions over 1985-92 suggest that electoral con...
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作者：Klumpp, T; Polborn, MK
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Candidates for U.S. presidential elections are determined through sequential elections in single states, the primaries. We develop a model in which candidates can influence their winning probability in electoral districts by spending money on campaigning. The equilibrium replicates several stylized facts very well: Campaigning is very intensive in the first district. The outcome of the first election then creates an asymmetry in the candidates' incentives to campaign in the next district, whic...
