Leniency policies and illegal transactions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.008
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1281-1297
• 关键词: amnesty; CORRUPTION; collusion; financial fraud; governance; hold up; HOSTAGES; illegal trade; immunity; law enforcement; leniency; organized crime; self-reporting; whistleblowers

摘要

We study the consequences of leniency-reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers-on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that-when not properly designed-leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence. (c) 2005 Published by Elsevier B.V.