Discrete public goods under threshold uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McBride, M
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.012
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1181-1199
• 关键词: collective action; PARTICIPATION

摘要

A discrete public good is provided when total contributions exceed the contribution threshold, yet the threshold is often not known with certainty. I show that the relationship between the degree of threshold uncertainty and equilibrium contributions and welfare is not monotonic. For a large class of threshold probability distributions, equilibrium contributions will be higher under increased uncertainty (e.g., a mean-preserving spread) if the public good's value is sufficiently high. Otherwise, and if another condition on the distribution's mode is met, contributions will be lower. The same result also obtains if a single-crossing condition of the pdfs is met. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.