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作者：Alonso-Carrera, Jaime; Caballe, Jordi; Raurich, Xavier
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidade de Vigo; Universidade de Vigo; University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
摘要：We study how the introduction of consumption externalities affects the optimality of the dynamic equilibrium in an economy displaying dynastic altruism. When the bequest motive is inoperative consumption externalities affect the intertemporal margin between young and old consumption and thus modify the intertemporal path of aggregate consumption and capital. The optimal tax policy that solves this intertemporal suboptimality consists of a tax on capital income and a pay-as-you-go social securi...
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作者：LaLumia, Sara
作者单位：Williams College
摘要：The United States changed its tax treatment of married couples in 1948, from a system in which each spouse paid taxes on his or her own income to a system in which a married couple is taxed as a unit. The switch from separate to joint taxation changed incentives for labor supply and asset ownership. This paper investigates the effects of the conversion to joint taxation, taking advantage of a natural experiment created by cross-state variation in property laws. Married individuals in states wi...
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作者：Martimort, David; Semenov, Aggey
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; National University of Singapore
摘要：We use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying. Interest groups influence the legislature only by communicating private information on their preferences and not by means of monetary transfers. Interest groups have private information on their ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space and may either compete or adopt more collusive behaviors. Optimal policies result from a trade-off between imposing rules which are non-r...
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作者：Gurgand, Marc; Margolis, David N.
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：This paper uses a representative sample of individuals on France's main welfare program (the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion, or RMI) to estimate monetary incentives for employment among welfare recipients. Based on the estimated joint distribution of wages and hours potentially offered to each individual, we compute potential gains from working in a very detailed manner. Relating these gains to observed employment, we then estimate a simple structural labor supply model. We find that potential gai...
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作者：Di Tella, Rafael; Dubra, Juan
作者单位：Harvard University; Universidad de Montevideo
摘要：We observe that countries where belief in the American dream(i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know that beliefs are also correlated with several features of the economic system (taxation, social insurance, etc). Our objective is to study the joint determination of these three features (beliefs, punitiveness and economic system) in a way that replicates the observed empirical patterns. We present a model where beliefs determine the types of contracts tha...
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作者：Belan, Pascal; Gauthier, Stephane; Laroque, Guy
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Nantes Universite
摘要：Indirect taxes contribute to a sizeable part of government revenues around the world. Typically there are few different tax rates, and the goods are partitioned into classes associated with each rate. The present paper studies how to group the goods in these few classes. We take as given the number of tax rates and study the optimal aggregation (or classification) of commodities of the fiscal authority in a second best setup. The results are illustrated on data from the United Kingdom. (c) 200...
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作者：Asker, John
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This paper studies the effect of a subsidy (or tax) on a market where a downstream manufacturer uses a competitive tender to procure inputs from upstream suppliers. Subsidizing input production can result in input price decreases that are greater than the effective decrease in marginal costs. That is, overshifting occurs. When the size of the subsidy is not too large, the downstream firm can enjoy an increase in profits greater than the government expenditure on the subsidy. A relatively weak ...
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作者：Donni, Olivier
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We consider the collective model of labor supply with marketable domestic production. We first show that, if domestic production is mistakenly ignored, the 'collective' indirect utility functions that are retrieved from observed behavior will be unbiased if and only if the retrieved from observed behavior will be unbiased if and only if the profit function is additive. Otherwise, in the non-additive case, the direction and the size of the bias will depend on the complementarity-substitutabilit...
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作者：Brekke, Kurt R.; Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd Rune
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); University of York - UK; University of York - UK; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universidade do Minho; Universidade do Minho; University of Bergen
摘要：This paper studies the impact of hospital competition on waiting times. We use a Salop-type model, with hospitals that differ in (geographical) location and, potentially, waiting time, and two types of patients: high-benefit patients who choose between neighbouring hospitals (competitive segment), and low-benefit patients who decide whether or not to demand treatment from the closest hospital (monopoly segment). Compared with a benchmark case of monopoly, we find that hospital competition lead...
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作者：Brett, Craig; Weymark, John A.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Mount Allison University
摘要：The impact of changing an individual's skill level on the solution to a finite population version of the Mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem with quasilinear-in-leisure preferences is investigated. It is shown that it is possible to sign the directions of change in everyone's optimal consumptions and optimal marginal tax rates in response to such a change. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
