Crime and punishment in the American dream

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Di Tella, Rafael; Dubra, Juan
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Universidad de Montevideo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.11.010
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1564-1584
• 关键词: beliefs; multiple equilibria; illegal behavior; fines; sentences

摘要

We observe that countries where belief in the American dream(i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know that beliefs are also correlated with several features of the economic system (taxation, social insurance, etc). Our objective is to study the joint determination of these three features (beliefs, punitiveness and economic system) in a way that replicates the observed empirical patterns. We present a model where beliefs determine the types of contracts that firms offer and whether workers exert effort. Some workers become criminals, depending on their luck in the labor market, the expected punishment, and an individual shock that we call meanness. It is this meanness level that a penal system based on retribution tries to detect when deciding the severity of the punishment. We find that when initial beliefs differ, two equilibria can emerge out of identical fundamentals. In the American (as opposed to the French) equilibrium, belief in the American dream is commonplace, workers exert effort, there are high powered contracts (and income is unequally distributed) and punishments are harsh. Economists who believe that deterrence (rather than retribution) shapes punishment can interpret the meanness parameter as pessimism about future economic opportunities and verify that two similar equilibria emerge. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.