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作者：Dahlberg, Matz; Moerk, Eva; Rattso, Jorn; Agren, Hanna
作者单位：Uppsala University; Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU)
摘要：When investigating the effects of federal grants on the behavior of lower-level governments, it is hard to defend the handling of grants as an exogenous factor. Federal governments often set grants based on characteristics and performance of decentralized governments. In this paper we make use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system in order to estimate the causal effects of general intergovernmental grants on local spending and local tax rates. The formula for the distribution of funds...
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作者：Chirinko, Robert S.; Wilson, Daniel J.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Over the past four decades, state investment tax incentives have proliferated. This emergence of state investment tax credits (ITC) and other investment tax incentives raises two important questions: I) Are these tax incentives effective in achieving their stated objective, to increase investment within the state?: 2) To the extent these incentives raise investment within the state, how much of this increase is due to investment drawn away from other states? To begin to answer these questions,...
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作者：Bordignon, Massimo; Colombo, Luca; Galmarini, Umberto
作者单位：Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Insubria
摘要：Which government functions should be decentralized (resp. centralized) once lobbying behavior is taken into account? We find that the answer largely depends on how the interests of the regional lobbies are positioned with respect to the function to be decentralized (resp. centralized). When regional lobbies have conflicting interests, then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under centralization than under decentralization. On the contrary, when regional lobbies have aligned interests...
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作者：Huber, Bernd; Runkel, Marco
作者单位：University of Munich
摘要：Empirical evidence from the U.S. and the European Union suggests that regions which contribute to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than regions which benefit from interregional redistribution. This paper presents an argument in favor of such differentiated budget institutions. It develops a two period model of a federation consisting of two types of regions. The federal government redistributes from one type of regions (contributors) to the other type (recipients)...
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作者：Boadway, Robin; Buettner, Thiess; Wildasin, David E.
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Kentucky; University of Kentucky
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作者：Kotsogiannis, Christos; Schwager, Robert
作者单位：University of Gottingen; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); University of Exeter
摘要：A common feature of multi-jurisdictional systems is equalization programs. The implementation of such programs, that is based on some measurement of sub-national fiscal capacity and effort, is particularly complex. Within a political economy model, this paper analyzes the impact of such systems on accountability, identifying a positive and a negative effect. The positive effect arises because with equalized fiscal resources, a consequence of equalization, citizens attach more importance to any...
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作者：Itaya, Jun-ichi; Okamura, Makoto; Yamaguchi, Chikara
作者单位：Hokkaido University; Hiroshima University
摘要：This paper reexamines the main findings of Cardarelli et a]. [Cardarelli, R., Taugourdeau, E., Vidal, J.-P., 2002. A repeated interactions model of tax competition, Journal of Public Economic Theory 4, 19-38], and Catenaro and Vidal [Catenaro, M., Vidal, J.-P., 2006. Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions, Recherches Economiques de Louvain 72, 1-17], who show that regional asymmetries undermine the implicit collusion of tax coordination in a repeated game model of capita...
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作者：Wilson, John Douglas
作者单位：Michigan State University
摘要：A major roadblock to the implementation of Bhagwati's proposal to allow developing countries to tax skilled emigrants residing in developed countries (the brain drain) is the administrative problems associated with collecting this tax in the absence of developed-country cooperation. This paper provides a partial solution to these problems, involving the tax treatment of emigrants who return to their countries of origin. The tax system is structured so that returning emigrants who previously pa...
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作者：Sole-Olle, Albert; Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar
作者单位：University of Barcelona
摘要：In this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper-tier grantor governments (i.e., controlled by the same party) will receive more grants than those that are unaligned. We use a rich Spanish database, which provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from three different upper-tier governments (i.e., Central, Regional and Upper-local). Since three elections were held at each tier during this period, we have enough wi...
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作者：Hindriks, Jean; Peralta, Susana; Weber, Shlomo
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Southern Methodist University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：The paper considers a model of federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the capital by competing in capital income taxes and public investment that enhance the productivity of capital. Regions' choices determine allocation of capital across the regions and their revenues under a tax sharing scheme. This framework allows for the examination of different approaches to fiscal equalization schemes [Boadway, R., Flatters, F., 1982. Efficiency and equalization payments in a fede...
