Fiscal federalism and lobbying

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Bordignon, Massimo; Colombo, Luca; Galmarini, Umberto
• 署名单位: Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Insubria
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.05.003
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 2288-2301
• 关键词: Fiscal federalism; lobbying; common agency; Games played through agents

摘要

Which government functions should be decentralized (resp. centralized) once lobbying behavior is taken into account? We find that the answer largely depends on how the interests of the regional lobbies are positioned with respect to the function to be decentralized (resp. centralized). When regional lobbies have conflicting interests, then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under centralization than under decentralization. On the contrary, when regional lobbies have aligned interests, then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under decentralization, provided that policy spillovers; on the non-organized groups are not too strong. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.