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作者：Schuett, Florian; Wagner, Alexander K.
作者单位：Tilburg University; University of Konstanz
摘要：Hindsight bias is a cognitive deficiency that leads people to overestimate ex post how predictable an event was. In this paper we develop a political-agency model in which voters are hindsight-biased and politicians differ in ability, defined as information concerning the optimal policy. When public information is not too accurate, low-ability politicians sometimes gamble on suboptimal policies: in an attempt to mimic the high-ability type, who has superior private information, they go against...
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作者：Markevich, Andrei; Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina
作者单位：New Economic School; University of Warwick; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We test the premise of the theoretical literature that M-form political hierarchies are effective in creating yardstick competition between regional divisions only when those divisions have sufficiently diversified or similar industrial composition. The reason for this is that the competition among poorly diversified interrelated divisions creates incentives for regional leaders to pursue policies that inhibit industrial growth in neighboring regions in order to make their own region look bett...
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作者：Frydman, Carola; Molloy, Raven S.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：The trends in executive pay and labor income tax rates since the 1940s suggest a high elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax policy. By contrast, the level and structure of executive compensation have been largely unresponsive to tax incentives since the 19805. However, the relative tax advantage of different forms of pay was small during this period. Using a sample of top executives in large firms from 1946 to 2005, we also find a small short run response of salaries, qualified stoc...
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作者：Havnes, Tarjei; Mogstad, Magne
作者单位：University of Oslo; Statistics Norway
摘要：The strong correlation between child care and maternal employment rates has led previous research to conclude that affordable and readily available child care is a driving force both of cross-country differences in maternal employment and of its rapid growth over the last decades. We analyze a staged expansion of subsidized child care in Norway. Our precise and robust difference-in-differences estimates reveal that there is little, if any, causal effect of subsidized child care on maternal emp...
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作者：Luelfesmann, Christoph; Myers, Gordon M.
作者单位：Simon Fraser University
摘要：The paper considers a two-tier institution in which government provides public services, but individuals can opt out of public provision (but not taxes). Funding for the public service is chosen endogenously by majority vote, and we first provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a majority vote equilibrium. In line with existing results, the equilibrium tax rate usually falls below the one found in a one-tier system (opting out of public consumption is prohibited) as the-public system l...
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作者：Posch, Olaf
作者单位：Aarhus University
摘要：This paper presents strong empirical evidence that the observed heterogeneity of output volatility across countries and over time is partly endogenous. In particular, based on a closed-form solution we obtain a (long-run) equilibrium relationship between taxes and output volatility in the stochastic neoclassical growth model by showing that asymptotically the variance of output growth rates is affected by the level of taxes, without affecting the mean. We estimate the tax semi-elasticities on ...
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作者：Zudenkova, Galina
作者单位：Universitat Rovira i Virgili; Universitat Rovira i Virgili; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：This paper provides a theoretical model for the coattail effect, where a popular candidate for one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government I assume a political agency framework with moral hazard in order to analyze the coattail effect in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is the outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politician...
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作者：Hoynes, Hilary W.; Luttmer, Erzo F. P.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; National Bureau of Economic Research; Dartmouth College
摘要：This paper estimates the total value that individuals derive from their state's tax-and-transfer program, and shows how this value varies by income. The paper decomposes this total value into two components: redistributive value, which is due to predictable changes in income (and family circumstances), and insurance value, which occurs when taxes and transfers compensate for unexpected income shocks. Our approach is a forward-looking one, where we examine income and transfers net of taxes over...
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作者：Janeba, Eckhard; Wilson, John Douglas
作者单位：Michigan State University; University of Mannheim
摘要：This paper models the optimal division of public goods provision between central and regional governments in an economy with interregional tax competition. Regional provision is inefficient because governments compete for scarce capital by lowering their capital taxes and public good levels to inefficiently low levels. On the other hand, central provision is inefficient because it is determined by the minimum winning coalition within a legislature. The optimal degree to which public good provi...
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作者：Brooks, Leah; Strange, William C.
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper carries out a micro-level analysis of collective goods provision by focusing on the formation of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs). The paper's theoretical and empirical analysis is unusually complete in that it considers the entire process of collective action, including participation in initial organization, voting, and ultimate impact on property values. BID benefits are shown to be highly uneven, and BID formation is not a Pareto improvement Furthermore, large anchor partici...
