The micro-empirics of collective action: The case of business improvement districts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brooks, Leah; Strange, William C.
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.015
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1358-1372
• 关键词: Local government; Private government; collective action

摘要

This paper carries out a micro-level analysis of collective goods provision by focusing on the formation of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs). The paper's theoretical and empirical analysis is unusually complete in that it considers the entire process of collective action, including participation in initial organization, voting, and ultimate impact on property values. BID benefits are shown to be highly uneven, and BID formation is not a Pareto improvement Furthermore, large anchor participants benefit disproportionately, and are crucial for the viability of the institution, consistent with Olson (1965). These results, while demonstrated in a particular setting, apply to collective action more generally. Whenever a market failure leaves room for a collective response, the presence of anchor participants encourages collective action, and the action - even though in a sense voluntary - has uneven benefits. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.