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作者：Francesconi, M
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：This article estimates a dynamic model of fertility and labor supply of married women drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women, 1968-91. It distinguishes part-time and full-time employment sectors, which differ by pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns and transferability of human capital. The model with unobserved heterogeneity in earning ability and preferences for children fits the data and produces reasonable forecasts of labor force participation in decisions. The estimates ...
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作者：Bowlus, A; Liu, HM; Robinson, C
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); National University of Singapore
摘要：A substantial literature has developed to estimate the true cyclicality of real wages, that is, composition bias free. Two major issues are addressed in this article: aggregation of heterogeneous workers and potential bias in the measurement of the labor input. A general analysis of the biases is presented, and alternative approaches in the literature are nested in a single framework. Estimates based on an efficiency units concept that avoids the usual aggregation problems are presented. Compo...
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作者：Carrington, WJ; McCue, K; Pierce, B
作者单位：United States Department of Labor
摘要：This article considers the impact of nondiscrimination (ND) rules in the federal tax code. Nondiscrimination rules limit within-firm inequality in the provision on nonwage benefits, but they place no corresponding limit on within-firm inequality in wages. Firms can skirt ND rules by moving workers with unusual benefits into part-time and seasonal positions because workers in such positions are excluded from some ND compliance calculations. We examine these issues empirically and find relations...
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作者：Olson, CA
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Compensating wage theory predicts that workers receiving more generous fringe benefits are paid a lower wage than comparable workers who prefer fewer fringe benefits. This study tests this prediction for employer-provided health insurance by modeling the wages of married women employed full-time in the labor market. Husband's union status, husband's firm size, and husband's health coverage through his job are used as instruments for his wife's own employer health insurance benefits. The estima...
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作者：Auriol, E; Friebel, G; Pechlivanos, L
摘要：We investigate how changes in the commitment power of a principal affect cooperation among agents who work in a team. When the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities, workers have career concerns. Then, unless the principal can commit herself to long-term wage contracts, an implicit sabotage incentive emerges. Agents become reluctant to help their team-mates. Anticipating this risk, and in order to induce the desired level of cooperation, the pr...
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作者：Wulf, J
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Do multidivisional firms structure compensation contracts for division managers to mitigate incentive problems in their internal capital markets? I find evidence that compensation and investment incentives are substitutes: firms providing a stronger link to firm performance in incentive compensation for division managers also provide weaker investment incentives through the capital budgeting process. Specifically, as the proportion of incentive pay for division managers that is based on firm p...
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作者：Rose, NL; Wolfram, C
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This study explores corporate responses to 1993 legislation that capped the corporate tax deductibility of top management compensation not qualified as performance-based. Our analysis suggests that the cap may have created a focal point for salary compensation but had little effect on total compensation levels or growth rates at firms likely to be affected by the limit. There is little evidence that the policy significantly increased the performance sensitivity of chief executive officer (CEO)...
