Regulating executive pay: Using the tax code to influence chief executive officer compensation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rose, NL; Wolfram, C
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/338677
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: S138-S175
• 关键词: electric utility industry; performance; management

摘要

This study explores corporate responses to 1993 legislation that capped the corporate tax deductibility of top management compensation not qualified as performance-based. Our analysis suggests that the cap may have created a focal point for salary compensation but had little effect on total compensation levels or growth rates at firms likely to be affected by the limit. There is little evidence that the policy significantly increased the performance sensitivity of chief executive officer (CEO) pay at affected firms. We conclude that corporate pay decisions have been relatively insulated from this policy intervention.