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作者：Baker, G; Shaw, K; Smith, A
作者单位：Harvard University; Carnegie Mellon University; University of Chicago
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作者：Wruck, EG; Wruck, KH
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We examine corporate spinoffs as events through which top management is restructured. Our main findings are: (1) firm-specific human capital and human capital, in the form of governance expertise and top management experience, affect the composition of spinoff firms' top management; (2) spinoff top management structure is related to the value created by a spinoff; and (3), for a subsample of firms, spinoffs serve as a form of management dismissal, with the opportunity to manage a smaller, weak...
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作者：Booth, AL; Chen, YF; Zoega, G
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Dundee; University of Iceland
摘要：The negative effect of quits on the willingness of firms to provide on-the-job training is well documented in the theoretical literature. Here we explore the strength of this effect by solving a firm's dynamic optimization problem where there is uncertainty about future productivity and nonzero firing costs. We find that the degree to which quit rates affect hiring depends on the ratio of firing to hiring costs. As this ratio rises, the negative effect of quits becomes less important, eventual...
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作者：Ittner, CD; Larcker, DF
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This study examines the determinants of performance measure choices in worker incentive plans. The results indicate that informativeness issues such as those addressed in economic theories have a significant effect on measurement choices. However, other reasons for adopting the plans, such as upgrading the workforce and linking bonuses to the firm's ability to pay, also influence measurement choices, as do union representation and management participation in plan design. Moreover, the factors ...
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作者：Allgulin, M; Ellingsen, T
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：The shirking model of efficiency wages has been thought to imply that monitoring and pay are substitute instruments for motivating workers. We demonstrate that this result is not generally true. As monitoring becomes cheaper, a given effort level will be implemented with more monitoring and less pay, but it is typically also optimal to implement a higher effort. The article provides conditions under which the latter scale effect dominates the former substitution effect and vice versa. If the e...
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作者：Di Tella, R; MacCulloch, RJ
作者单位：Harvard University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：While much empirical research exists on labor market consequences of unemployment benefits, there is remarkably little evidence on the forces determining benefits. We present a simple model where workers desire insurance against unemployment risk and benefits increase the unemployment rate. We then conduct one of the first empirical analyses of the determinants of the parameters of the benefit system. Using data for developed countries for 1971-89, controlling for year and country fixed effect...
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作者：Prendergast, C
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Empirical work testing for a trade-off between risk and incentives has had, at best, mixed success. This article provides two simple reasons, associated with subjectivity of performance appraisals, why we might not expect to see any negative relationship. Both reasons relate to empirically observed problems associated with monitoring: (i) supervisors sometimes bias their evaluations based on their personal feelings toward their subordinates, and (ii) supervisors will sometimes offer evaluation...
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作者：Gietzmann, M; Hemmer, T
作者单位：University of Bristol; University of Chicago
摘要：We study optimal incentives for a two-stage production process. First, we identify conditions under which the optimal incentive structure for both workers is based on total volume and conditions for when the final stage worker's incentives are based on relative performance. We show that a bottleneck-free and balanced line is optimal only when both workers' contracts are based on volume, while it becomes desirable to limit the final stage worker's productivity when his compensation is based on ...
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作者：Rotemberg, JJ
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This article develops a model in which quit rates, and thus the income distribution, depend on employee perceptions of the accuracy of employer assessments of individual productivity because these latter assessments affect wages. When employees believe that these assessments are accurate, income inequality tends to be high. The model can account for the negative correlation across some countries of inequality and the extent to which inequality is deemed to be excessive. It also fits the contra...
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作者：Dolton, P; O'Neill, D
作者单位：University of Newcastle; Maynooth University
摘要：This article examines the long-run effects of the Restart unemployment program in the United Kingdom. The program, aimed at the long-term unemployed, involved a combination of tighter monitoring of benefit eligibility rules and increased job search assistance. We compare the employment behavior of a treatment group who participated in the scheme with that of a randomly chosen control group for whom participation was delayed. While there is little evidence of a long-term benefit for women, the ...
