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作者：Bound, J; Turner, S
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Virginia
摘要：The flood of veterans enrolling in college at the end of World War II contributed to widespread rhetoric that the G. I. Bill brought about the democratization of American higher education. Whether military service, combined with educational benefits, led World War II veterans to increase their investments in college has received little research attention. Our estimation strategy focuses on between-cohort differences in military service, and we use census data to compare the collegiate attainme...
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作者：Baker, G; Shaw, K; Smith, A
作者单位：Harvard University; Carnegie Mellon University; University of Chicago
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作者：Wruck, EG; Wruck, KH
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We examine corporate spinoffs as events through which top management is restructured. Our main findings are: (1) firm-specific human capital and human capital, in the form of governance expertise and top management experience, affect the composition of spinoff firms' top management; (2) spinoff top management structure is related to the value created by a spinoff; and (3), for a subsample of firms, spinoffs serve as a form of management dismissal, with the opportunity to manage a smaller, weak...
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作者：Kandel, E; Simhon, A
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We present a model in which unemployed workers simultaneously sample n potential employers. By varying n, we nest search and Walrasian-type models of the labor market. We show that low values of n yield typical search equilibria: the wages are dispersed below the marginal productivity of labor. Interestingly, as n exceeds a relatively small threshold, the Walrasian-type equilibrium emerges with the competitive wage quoted by all firms. For intermediate values of n, the equilibrium is a hybrid ...
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作者：Ortín-Angel, P; Salas-Fumás, V
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Zaragoza
摘要：This article presents evidence on the relationship between compensation ratios and spans of control within hierarchical organizations. We find that compensation ratios are lower than span of control at any position within the hierarchy, which is consistent with an elasticity of compensation to a number of subordinates lower than one. Managers' human capital endowments determine a significant part of the salary differences throughout hierarchical levels, as predicted by models of talent allocat...
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作者：Booth, AL; Chen, YF; Zoega, G
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Dundee; University of Iceland
摘要：The negative effect of quits on the willingness of firms to provide on-the-job training is well documented in the theoretical literature. Here we explore the strength of this effect by solving a firm's dynamic optimization problem where there is uncertainty about future productivity and nonzero firing costs. We find that the degree to which quit rates affect hiring depends on the ratio of firing to hiring costs. As this ratio rises, the negative effect of quits becomes less important, eventual...
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作者：Ittner, CD; Larcker, DF
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This study examines the determinants of performance measure choices in worker incentive plans. The results indicate that informativeness issues such as those addressed in economic theories have a significant effect on measurement choices. However, other reasons for adopting the plans, such as upgrading the workforce and linking bonuses to the firm's ability to pay, also influence measurement choices, as do union representation and management participation in plan design. Moreover, the factors ...
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作者：Hvide, HK
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：This article considers a Lazear-Rosen tournament model where agents can influence both the spread of their output distribution ( risk taking) and its mean. The unique equilibrium induces excessive risk taking and a low level of effort. By modifying the tournament to give the highest prize to the agent with the most moderate output, a low level of risk taking and high level of effort can be sustained as an equilibrium. The first result can be useful to understand the Relative Performance Evalua...
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作者：Allgulin, M; Ellingsen, T
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：The shirking model of efficiency wages has been thought to imply that monitoring and pay are substitute instruments for motivating workers. We demonstrate that this result is not generally true. As monitoring becomes cheaper, a given effort level will be implemented with more monitoring and less pay, but it is typically also optimal to implement a higher effort. The article provides conditions under which the latter scale effect dominates the former substitution effect and vice versa. If the e...
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作者：Di Tella, R; MacCulloch, RJ
作者单位：Harvard University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：While much empirical research exists on labor market consequences of unemployment benefits, there is remarkably little evidence on the forces determining benefits. We present a simple model where workers desire insurance against unemployment risk and benefits increase the unemployment rate. We then conduct one of the first empirical analyses of the determinants of the parameters of the benefit system. Using data for developed countries for 1971-89, controlling for year and country fixed effect...
