Career concerns in teams

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Auriol, E; Friebel, G; Pechlivanos, L
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/338240
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 289-307
• 关键词: incentive contracts; job design

摘要

We investigate how changes in the commitment power of a principal affect cooperation among agents who work in a team. When the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities, workers have career concerns. Then, unless the principal can commit herself to long-term wage contracts, an implicit sabotage incentive emerges. Agents become reluctant to help their team-mates. Anticipating this risk, and in order to induce the desired level of cooperation, the principal offers more collectively oriented incentive schemes. Temporary workers, though, are not affected by the sabotage effect, and their incentives are more individually oriented.