Compensation and span of control in hierarchical organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ortín-Angel, P; Salas-Fumás, V
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Zaragoza
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/342040
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 848-876
• 关键词: Incentives; wage; firm; performance; tournaments

摘要

This article presents evidence on the relationship between compensation ratios and spans of control within hierarchical organizations. We find that compensation ratios are lower than span of control at any position within the hierarchy, which is consistent with an elasticity of compensation to a number of subordinates lower than one. Managers' human capital endowments determine a significant part of the salary differences throughout hierarchical levels, as predicted by models of talent allocation in hierarchies. Differences in the size of firms should be attributed more to differences in their number of hierarchical levels than to variations in the span of control.