Social image concerns and welfare take-up

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Friedrichsen, Jana; Koenig, Tobias; Schmacker, Renke
• 署名单位: Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; Humboldt University of Berlin; Free University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.10.008
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 174-192
• 关键词: stigma; signaling; redistribution; Non-take-up; Welfare program

摘要

Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled (ability stigma) and of being willing to live off others (free-rider stigma). Using a placebo treatment, we exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effects. Although stigma reduces take-up, elicitation of political preferences reveals that only a minority of taxpayers vote for the public transfer. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.