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作者：Dewatripont, Mathias; Legros, Patrick; Matthews, Steven A.
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We base a contracting theory for a startup firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and renegotiable contracts. Two essential restrictions on simple contracts are imposed: the entrepreneur must be given limited liability, and the investor's earnings must not decrease in the realized profit of the firm. All message game contracts with pure strategy equilibria (and no third parties) are considered. Within this class of contracts/equilibria, and regardless of who has the ...
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作者：Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido; Trebbi, Francesco
作者单位：Stockholm University; Bocconi University; Harvard University
摘要：Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? Recent theoretical work suggests a positive answer. But little is known about the data. We try to address this lacuna by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample of about eighty democracies in the 1990s. We exploit the cross-country variation in the data, as well as the time variation arising from recent episodes of electoral reform. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical priors. Larger votin...
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作者：Rochet, Jean-Charles; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse
摘要：Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed, platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and the Internet, must get both sides of the market on board. Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to their business model, that is, to how they court each side while making money overall. This paper builds a model of platform competition with two-sided markets. It unveils the determinants of price allocation and end-user surplus fo...
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作者：Abbring, Jaap H.; Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Pinquet, Jean
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Chicago; Universite Paris Nanterre
摘要：This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazard. We first show that experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence under moral hazard: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. We then show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish this moral-hazard effect from dynamic selection on unobservables. We develop nonparametric tests and estimate a flexible parametric model. We find no evidence of moral...
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作者：Krueger, Alan B.; Fortson, Kenneth N.
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Since 1979, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has nearly quadrupled the size of the sample used to estimate monthly employment changes. Although first-reported employment estimates are still noisy, the magnitude of sampling variability has declined in proportion to the increase in the sample size. A model of rational Bayesian updating predicts that investors would assign more weight to the BLS employment survey as it became more precise. However, a regression analysis of changes in interest...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Benabou, Roland
作者单位：Princeton University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study political activism by several interest groups with private signals. When their ideological distance to the policymaker is small, a low-trust regime prevails: agents frequently lobby even when it is unwarranted, taking advantage of the confirmation provided by others' activism; conversely, the policymaker responds only to generalized pressure. When ideological distance is large, a high-trust regime prevails: lobbying behavior is disciplined by the potential contradiction from abstainer...
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作者：Attanasio, Orazio P.; Emmerson, Carl
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In this paper we use the two waves of the British Retirement Survey (1988/1989 and 1994) to quantify the relationship between socioeconomic status and health outcomes. We find that, even after conditioning on the initial health status, wealth rankings are important determinants of mortality and the evolution of the health indicator in the survey. For men aged 65 moving from the 40th percentile to the 60th percentile in the wealth distribution increases the probability of survival by between 1....
