MORAL HAZARD AND DYNAMIC INSURANCE DATA

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abbring, Jaap H.; Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Pinquet, Jean
• 署名单位: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Chicago; Universite Paris Nanterre
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1162/154247603322493159
• 发表日期: 2003
• 关键词: Adverse selection; identification; MODEL; RISK

摘要

This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazard. We first show that experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence under moral hazard: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. We then show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish this moral-hazard effect from dynamic selection on unobservables. We develop nonparametric tests and estimate a flexible parametric model. We find no evidence of moral hazard in French car insurance. Our analysis contributes to a recent literature based on static data that has problems distinguishing between moral hazard and selection and dealing with dynamic features of actual insurance contracts. Methodologically, this paper builds on and extends the literature on state dependence and heterogeneity in event-history data. (JEL: D82, G22, C41, C14)