TRUST, COORDINATION, AND THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Battaglini, Marco; Benabou, Roland
署名单位：
Princeton University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/154247603322493177
发表日期：
2003
关键词：
摘要：
We study political activism by several interest groups with private signals. When their ideological distance to the policymaker is small, a low-trust regime prevails: agents frequently lobby even when it is unwarranted, taking advantage of the confirmation provided by others' activism; conversely, the policymaker responds only to generalized pressure. When ideological distance is large, a high-trust regime prevails: lobbying behavior is disciplined by the potential contradiction from abstainers, and the policymaker's response threshold is correspondingly lower. Within some intermediate range, both equilibria coexist. We then study the optimal organization of influence activities, contrasting welfare levels when interest groups act independently and when they coordinate. (JEL: D72, D78, D82)
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