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作者：Brock, William A.; Durlauf, Steven N.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper considers the observational implications of social influences on adoption decisions for an environment of perfect foresight adopters. We argue that social influences can produce two observable effects: (1) discontinuities in unconditional adoption curves and (2) pattern reversals in conditional adoption curves, in which earlier adoption is found for one group of actors versus another when fundamentals suggest the reverse ordering should occur; in turn the presence of either of these...
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作者：Ghiglino, Christian; Goyal, Sanjeev
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Cambridge
摘要：We consider a world in which individuals have private endowments and trade in markets while their utility is negatively affected by the consumption of their neighbors. Our interest is in understanding how the social structure of comparisons, taken together with the familiar fundamentals of the economy (endowments, technology, and preferences), shapes equilibrium prices, allocations, and welfare. We show that equilibrium prices and consumption are a function of a single network statistic: centr...
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作者：Ballester, Coralio; Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; ICREA; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Stockholm University
摘要：Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecti...
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作者：Fafchamps, Marcel; Goyal, Sanjeev; van der Leij, Marco J.
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Cambridge; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：The matching of individuals in teams is a key element in the functioning of an economy. The network of social ties can potentially transmit important information on abilities and reputations and also help mitigate matching frictions by facilitating interactions among screened individuals. We conjecture that the probability of two individuals forming a team falls in the distance between the two individuals in the network of existing social ties. The objective of this paper is to empirically tes...
