DELINQUENT NETWORKS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ballester, Coralio; Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves
• 署名单位: Universitat d'Alacant; ICREA; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Stockholm University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1162/jeea.2010.8.1.34
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 34-61
• 关键词: Social networks; crime; centrality; peers; games

摘要

Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network. (JEL: A14, C72, K42, L14)