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作者：Frankel, Alex; Kartik, Navin
作者单位：University of Chicago; Columbia University
摘要：Data-based decision making must account for the manipulation of data by agents who are aware of how decisions are being made and want to affect their allocations. We study a framework in which, due to such manipulation, data become less informative when decisions depend more strongly on data. We formalize why and how a decision maker should commit to underutilizing data. Doing so attenuates information loss and thereby improves allocation accuracy.
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作者：Corsetti, Giancarlo; Duarte, Joao B.; Mann, Samuel
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Universidade Nova de Lisboa; International Monetary Fund
摘要：We study heterogeneity in the transmission of monetary shocks across euro-area (EA) countries using a dynamic factor model and high-frequency identification. Deploying a novel methodology to asses the degree of heterogeneity, we find it to be low in financial variables and output but significant in consumption, consumer prices, and variables related to local housing and labour markets. We show that a large proportion of the variation in the responses to monetary shocks can be accounted for by ...
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作者：Sovinsky, Michelle
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：Every year thousands of firms are engaged in research joint ventures (RJV), where all knowledge gained through research and development (R&D) is shared among members. Most of the empirical literature assumes members are non-cooperative in the product market. But many RJV members are rivals leaving open the possibility that firms may form RJVs to facilitate product market collusion. We examine this by exploiting variation in RJV formation generated by a policy change that affects the collusive ...
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作者：Dutta, Rohan; Levin, David K.; Modica, Salvatore
作者单位：McGill University; European University Institute; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Palermo
摘要：We study the consequences of policy interventions when social norms are endogenous but costly to change. In our environment, a group faces a negative externality that it partially mitigates through incentives in the form of punishments. In this setting, policy interventions can have unexpected consequences. The most striking is that when the cost of bargaining is high, introducing a Pigouvian tax can increase output-yet in doing so increase welfare. An observer who saw that an increase in a Pi...
