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作者：Bjorkman Nyqvist, Martina; Svensson, Jakob; Yanagizawa-Drott, David
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Stockholm University; University of Zurich
摘要：How can quality be improved in markets in developing countries, which are known to be plagued by substandard and counterfeit (fake, in short) products? We study the market for antimalarial drugs in Uganda, where we randomly assign entry of a retailer (non-governmental organization (NGO)) providing a superior product-an authentic drug priced below the market-and investigate how incumbent firms and consumers respond. We find that the presence of the NGO had economically important effects. Approx...
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作者：Sovinsky, Michelle
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：Every year thousands of firms are engaged in research joint ventures (RJV), where all knowledge gained through research and development (R&D) is shared among members. Most of the empirical literature assumes members are non-cooperative in the product market. But many RJV members are rivals leaving open the possibility that firms may form RJVs to facilitate product market collusion. We examine this by exploiting variation in RJV formation generated by a policy change that affects the collusive ...
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作者：Acharya, Sushant; Dogra, Keshav
作者单位：Bank of Canada; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：We present an incomplete markets model to understand the costs and benefits of increasing government debt when an increased demand for safety pushes the natural rate of interest below zero. A higher demand for safe assets causes the zero lower bound (ZLB) to bind, increasing unemployment. Higher government debt satiates the demand for safe assets, raising the natural rate, and restoring full employment. However, this entails permanently lower investment, which reduces welfare, since our econom...
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作者：Dutta, Rohan; Levin, David K.; Modica, Salvatore
作者单位：McGill University; European University Institute; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Palermo
摘要：We study the consequences of policy interventions when social norms are endogenous but costly to change. In our environment, a group faces a negative externality that it partially mitigates through incentives in the form of punishments. In this setting, policy interventions can have unexpected consequences. The most striking is that when the cost of bargaining is high, introducing a Pigouvian tax can increase output-yet in doing so increase welfare. An observer who saw that an increase in a Pi...
