作者：Caillaud, B; Jéhiel, P
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; University College London
摘要：In standard auctions, collusion among buyers eliminates bidding competition despite informational asymmetries. Collusion can, however, be imperfect when the situation involves externalities among buyers, that is, when a buyer is worse off if one rival wins the goon rather than if nobody gets it. For intermediate values of the externality and under various objective functions, the seller finds it optimal to design an auction that leads, in equilibrium, to a collusive outcome that is ex post ine...
作者：Banerjee, A; Eckard, EW
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Denver; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Calcutta
摘要：In the first event-time analysis of the great merger wave of 1897-1903, we find that the consolidations created value for merger participants of 12% to 18%. We next find that competitors suffered significant value losses inconsistent with conventional monopoly behavior (i.e., trust-induced output reductions and price increases). This result might be explained by apprehensions of trust predation rather than expected efficiency, but further analysis suggests that this is unlikely. Revelation of ...
