Collusion in auctions with externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Caillaud, B; Jéhiel, P
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/2556089
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 680-702
• 关键词: information; mechanisms

摘要

In standard auctions, collusion among buyers eliminates bidding competition despite informational asymmetries. Collusion can, however, be imperfect when the situation involves externalities among buyers, that is, when a buyer is worse off if one rival wins the goon rather than if nobody gets it. For intermediate values of the externality and under various objective functions, the seller finds it optimal to design an auction that leads, in equilibrium, to a collusive outcome that is ex post inefficient for the group of buyers; an ex ante incentive-efficient collusion mechanism for the buyers is characterized in this situation.