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作者：Kortum, S; Lerner, J
作者单位：Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：We examine the influence of venture capital on patented inventions in the United States across twenty industries over three decades. We address concerns about causality in several ways, including exploiting a 1979 policy shift that spurred venture capital fundraising. We find that increases in venture capital activity in an industry are associated with significantly higher patenting rates. While the ratio of venture capital to R&D averaged less than 3% from 1983-1992, our estimates suggest tha...
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作者：Nevo, A
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Traditional merger analysis is difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in industries with differentiated products. I discuss an alternative, which consists of demand estimation and the use of a model of postmerger conduct to simulate the competitive effects of a merger. I estimate a brand-level demand system for ready-to-eat cereal using supermarket scanner data and use the estimates to (1) recover marginal costs, (2) simulate postmerger price equilibria, and (3) compute welfare effects...
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作者：Fudenberg, D; Tirole, J
作者单位：Harvard University; Universite de Toulouse; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Firms sometimes try to poach the customers of their competitors by offering them inducements to switch. We analyze duopoly poaching under both short-term and longterm contracts assuming either that each consumer's brand preferences are fixed over rime or that preferences are independent over time. With fixed preferences, short-term contracts lead to poaching and socially inefficient switching. The equilibrium with long-term contracts has less switching than when only short-term contracts are f...
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作者：Suen, W
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：I offer a competitive explanation for the rush toward early contracting in matching markets. The explanation does not rely on market power, strategic motives, or instability of the assignment mechanism. Uncertainty about workers' ability will produce inefficient matching if contracts are formed early. However, the insurance gain from early contracting may outweigh the loss from inefficient matching. If firms are risk neutral, it is the mediocre firms that will have the greatest incentive to of...
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作者：Jehiel, P; Moldovanu, B
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Mannheim
摘要：We study an auction whose outcome influences the future interaction among agents. The impact of that interaction on agent i is assumed to be a function of all agents' types (which are private information at the time of the auction). Explicit illustrations treat auctions of patents and takeover contests. We derive equilibria for second-price, sealed-bid auctions in which the seller sometimes keeps the object, and we point out the various effects caused by positive and negative impacts. We also ...
