作者：Pacheco-de-Almeida, G; Zemsky, P
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We show that time-to-build, which creates a lag between the decision to invest and production, is an important element of industry structure. We-study a multiperiod investment game where there is demand uncertainty. Adding time-to-build to the model alters the classic tradeoff between making strategic commitments and exploiting the option to wait. Furthermore, time-to-build gives rise to novel equilibria in which firms invest incrementally, which contrasts with most prior work on multiperiod i...
作者：Spier, KE
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Many settlement contracts in litigation involving multiple plaintiffs (or multiple defendants) include most-favored-nation. (MFN) clauses. If an early settlement includes an MFN and the defendant settles later with another plaintiff for more money, the early settlers receive these terms too. If the defendant knows the aggregate distribution of expected awards but cannot discriminate among the Privately informed plaintiffs, then MFNs avoid costly delay. Plaintiffs with weak cases settle early r...
