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作者：Cespa, G
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：I analyze a multi-asset market under two trading mechanisms. In the first (the unrestricted system), traders' demand for each asset depends on all equilibrium prices, and prices reflect the information contained in all order flows; in the second (the restricted system), traders' demand depends on the traded asset price, and prices reflect single order flow information. I show that informed traders' use of multidimensional private information depends on the number of prices they observe and on ...
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作者：Kalnins, A; Lafontaine, F
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We use data on all the new restaurants opened in Texas between 1980 and 1995 by seven of the largest nationally franchised fast-food chains to examine empirically the extent of multi-unit ownership in franchised chains and the way in which franchisors allocate the ownership of units among franchisees. We find that individual franchisees are much more likely to be assigned the ownership of a particular new unit the closer their existing units are geographically to the new unit. Further, given d...
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作者：Bhaskar, V; To, T
作者单位：University of Essex; United States Department of Labor
摘要：We analyze models of product differentiation with perfect price discrimination and free entry. With a fixed number of firms, and in the absence of coordination failures, perfect price discrimination provides incentives for firms to choose product characteristics in a socially optimal way. However with free entry, the number of firms is always excessive. Our results apply to a large class of models of product differentiation. They also apply to models of common agency or lobbying with free entr...
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作者：Taylor, CR
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：I investigate consumer privacy and the market for customer information in electronic retailing. The value of customer information derives from the ability of Internet firms to identify individual consumers and charge them personalized prices. I study two settings, a confidential regime in which the sale of customer information is not possible, and a disclosure regime in which one firm may compile and sell a customer list to another firm that uses it to price discriminate. Welfare comparisons d...
