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作者：Burguet, R; Che, YK
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study competitive procurement administered by a corrupt agent who is willing to manipulate his evaluation of contract proposals in exchange for bribes. With complete information and no corruption, the efficient firm will win the contract for sure. If the agent is corrupt and has large manipulation power however bribery makes it costly for the efficient firm to secure a sure win, so in equilibrium the efficient firm loses the contract with positive probability The optimal scoring rule for th...
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作者：Anton, JJ; Yao, DA
作者单位：Duke University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Exploitation of an innovation commonly requires some disclosure of enabling knowledge (e.g., to obtain a patent or induce complementary investment). When property rights offer only limited protection, the value of the disclosure is offset by the increased threat of imitation. Our model incorporates three,features critical to this setting: innovation creates asymmetric information, innovation often has only limited legal protection, and disclosure,facilitates imitation. Imitation depends on inf...
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作者：Gerlach, HA
作者单位：University of Auckland
摘要：I study the incentives of innovating firms to announce their entry in markets in which consumers incur a cost of switching from one product to another. Announcing entry can prevent the lock-in of potential demand before the launch of the new product. At the same time, however, the incumbent firm learns about the impending entry and has the opportunity to cut prices and preempt the market. In equilibrium, entrants do not always announce, and I show that this behavior maximizes ex ante total wel...
