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作者：O'Brien, DP; Shaffer, G
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：We examine the output and profit effects of horizontal mergers between differentiated upstream firms in an intermediate-goods market served by a downstream monopolist. If the merged firm can bundle, transfer pricing is efficient before and after the merger. Absent cost efficiencies, consumer and total welfare do not change. If the merged firm cannot bundle and its bargaining power is sufficiently high, transfer pricing is inefficient after the merger. Absent cost efficiencies, welfare typicall...
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作者：Arlen, J; MacLeod, WB
作者单位：New York University; Columbia University
摘要：We examine optimal individual and entity-level liability for negligence when expected accident costs depend on both the agent's level of expertise and the principal's level of authority. We consider these issues in the context of physician and managed care organization (MCO) liability for medical malpractice. Under current law, physicians generally are considered independent contractors and hence MCOs are not liable for negligent acts by physicians. We find that the practice of reviewing the m...
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作者：Lyon, TP; Mayo, JW
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Georgetown University
摘要：Large sunk costs and incomplete regulatory contracts in public utilities create the Possibility of opportunistic behavior by either regulators or regulated firms. We present an empirical methodology for identifying opportunism within a regulated setting, and apply it to the large-scale cost disallowances levied by state regulators on electric utilities during the 1980s. Examining the investment propensity of all firms-both those that faced cost disallowances and those that did not-within parti...
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作者：Toivanen, O; Waterson, M
作者单位：University of Helsinki; University of Warwick
摘要：We study the effects of market structure on entry using data from the U.K.. fast food (counterservice burger) industry over the years 1991-1995, for which the market can be characterized as a duopoly. We use both reduced-form estimations and a structural model, controlling for market-specific time-invariant unobservables. For both firms, we find that market structure matters greatly. Specifically, rival presence increases the probability of entry by increasing expected market size, whereas var...
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作者：de Fontenay, CC; Gans, JS
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：We analyze vertical integration to compare outcomes under upstream competition and monopoly. This is done in a model based on the property rights approach to firm boundaries and where multilateral negotiations are modelled using a fully specified, noncooperative bargaining game. We demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoff of integrating parties in ex post bargaining; however, this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstre...
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作者：Borenstein, S; Holland, S
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Greensboro
摘要：Most customers in electricity markets do not face prices that change frequently to reflect changes in wholesale costs, known as real-time pricing (RTP). We show that not only does time-invariant pricing in competitive markets lead to prices and investment that are not first best, it evenfails to achieve the constrained second-best optimum. Increasing the share of customers on RTP is likely to improve efficiency, though surprisingly it does not necessarily reduce capacity investment, and it is ...
