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作者：Ariely, Dan; Ockenfels, Axel; Roth, Alvin E.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Cologne; Harvard University
摘要：A great deal of late bidding has been observed on eBay, which employs a second price auction with a fixed deadline. Much less late bidding has been observed oil Amazon, which can only end when ten minutes have passed without a bid. In controlled experiments, we find that the difference in the ending rules is sufficient by itself to produce the differences in late bidding observed in the field data. The data also allow us to examine bid amounts in relation to private values, and how behavior is...
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作者：Luelfesmann, Christoph
作者单位：Simon Fraser University
摘要：I investigate a model in which two parties A and B invest sequentially in a joint project (an asset). Investments and the asset value are nonverifiable, and A is wealth-constrained so that an initial outlay must be financed by either an agent, B (insider financing), or an external investor, a bank C (outsider financing). I show that an option contract in combination with a loan arrangement facilitates first-best investments and any arbitrary distribution of surplus if renegotiation is infeasib...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Hege, Ulrich
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We consider the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. We distinguish between two financing modes, namely relationship financing, where the allocation decision of the entrepreneur is observable, and arm's length financing, where it is unobservable. We find that equilibrium funding stops altogether too early relative to the efficient stopping time in both financing modes. The rate at which funding is released becom...
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作者：Gonzalez, Xulia; Jaumandreu, Jordi; Pazo, Consuelo
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We explore the effects of subsidies by means of a model of firms' decisions about performing R&D when some government support can be expected. We estimate it with data on about 2,000 performing and nonperforming Spanish manufacturing firms. We compute the subsidies required to induce R&D spending, we detect the firms that would cease to perform R&D without subsidies, and assess the change in the privately financed effort. Results suggest that subsidies stimulate R&D and some firms would stop p...
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作者：Mialon, Hugo M.
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：The Fifth Amendment's due process clause requires the prosecution to share evidence with the defense, and the right to silence that it guarantees blocks the jury from drawing an adverse inference from a defendant's silence during trial. I examine the effect of the right to silence and the disclosure requirement on conviction rates and social welfare in an economic model of criminal trials. Many policy-relevant results emerge. The right to silence can improve welfare only if juries discriminate...
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作者：Beresteanu, Arie
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Using data on local exchange carriers (LECs), I estimate the total cost function of LECs operating between 1988 and 1995. First, I show that cost complementarities can be nonparametrically identified in many situations where economies of scope and subadditivity-the focus of previous empirical research-cannot be identified. Next, I implement a feasible nonparametric estimation model restricting the cost function to satisfy properties required by economic theory. The results support the assumpti...
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作者：Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew; Viswanathan, S.
作者单位：Columbia University; Duke University
摘要：In many auctions, bidders do not have enough cash to pay their bid. If bidders have asymmetric cash positions and independent private values, then auctions will be inefficient. However, what happens if bidders have access to financial markets? We characterize efficient auctions and show that in an efficient auction the information rent that a bidder earns depends generally on both his valuation and his cash position. In contrast, a competitive capital market that is efficient must have informa...
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作者：Thomadsen, Raphael
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：I analyze how ownership structure and market geography jointly influence fast food prices. I estimate a model of demand and supply that accounts for the market geography and run counterfactual experiments that demonstrate how mergers affect prices. I find that the impact of mergers can be large, that this impact decreases as the merging outlets are farther apart, that mergers among market leaders generally increase prices more than mergers among weaker firms, and that mergers can increase pric...
