作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We provide a model wherein oligopolists produce differentiated products that also have a safety attribute. Consumption of these products may lead to harm (to consumers and/or third parties), lawsuits, and compensation, either via settlement or trial. Firm-level costs reflect both safety investment and production activities, as well as liability-related costs. Compensation is incomplete, both because of inefficiencies in the bargaining process and (possibly) because of statutorily established l...
作者：Baldenius, Tim
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Vertical integration is often proposed as a way to resolve hold-up problems. This ignores the empirical fact that division managers tend to maximize divisional (not firmwide) profit when investing. I develop a model with asymmetric information at the bargaining stage and investment returns taking the form of cash and empire benefits. Owners of a vertically integrated firm will then provide division managers with low-powered incentives to induce them to bargain more cooperatively, resulting in ...
作者：Chan, Tat Y.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Using micro-level scanner data, I study empirically the consumer demand for soft drinks, which is characterized by multiple-product, multiple-unit purchasing behavior. I develop a continuous hedonic-choice model to investigate how consumers choose the best basket of products to satisfy various needs. My model's embedded-characteristics approach both helps to reduce the dimensionality problem in model estimation and generates flexible substitution patterns. Hence, the model is useful in applica...
