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作者：Chen, Yongmin; Riordan, Michael H.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Columbia University
摘要：This article uncovers an unnoticed connection between exclusive contracts and vertical organization. A vertically integrated firm can use exclusive dealing to foreclose an equally efficient upstream competitor and to cartelize the downstream industry. Neither vertical integration nor exclusive dealing alone achieves these anticompetitive effects. The cartelization effect of these two practices may be limited when downstream firms are heterogeneous and supply contracts are not contingent on unc...
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作者：Bagwell, Kyle
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：I consider whether a privately informed incumbent can use limit pricing and upward distortions in advertising to deter profitable entry. Profitable entry is not deterred when the incumbent is privately informed only about its cost type. Profitable entry may be deterred, however, if the incumbent is privately informed about its cost type and its patience level. An equilibrium foundation is thus provided for the traditional hypothesis that limit pricing and aggressive advertising by an incumbent...
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作者：Ishii, Jun; Yan, Jingming
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：An empirical model of the make or buy decision faced by independent power producers (IPPs) in restructured U.S. wholesale electricity markets is derived to analyze power plant investment decisions by major IPPs from 1996 to 2000. The estimated investment cost and expected profit functions are used to evaluate the effectiveness of divestiture programs (which sold utility power plants to IPPs) in encouraging greater IPP participation. The estimates and counterfactual simulations indicate that a ...
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作者：Alonso, Ricardo; Matouschek, Niko
作者单位：University of Southern California; Northwestern University
摘要：We analyze a cheap talk game with partial commitment by the principal. We first treat the principal's commitment power as exogenous and then endogenize it in an infinitely repeated game. We characterize optimal decision making for any commitment power and show when it takes the form of threshold delegation-in which case the agent can make any decision below a threshold-and centralization-in which case the agent has no discretion. For small biases, threshold delegation is optimal for any smooth...
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作者：Araujo, Aloisio; Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We develop a job-market signalling model where signals convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study countersignalling (signals nonmonotonic in ability) and the GED exam. A result of the model is that countersignalling is more likely to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low...
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作者：Aarland, Kristin; Davis, James C.; Henderson, J. Vernon; Ono, Yukako
作者单位：Brown University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：A firm's production activities are often supported by nonproduction activities, such as administrative units including headquarters, which process information both within and between firms. Firms may physically separate such administrative units from their production activities and create stand-alone central administrative offices (CAOs). However, activities in multiple locations may cause internal communication costs. What types of firms are more likely to separate such functions? If firms se...
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作者：Qiu, Larry D.; Zhou, Wen
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We develop a model of endogenous mergers to study their dynamic process. Firms choose whether, when, and with whom to merge. Two necessary conditions are identified for mergers to occur:firm heterogeneity and negative demand shocks. We show that mergers are strategic complements and therefore tend to occur in waves. Moreover, some mergers occur for strategic reasons in order to precipitate further mergers.
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作者：Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Kovenock, Dan
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Kent State University; Kent State University Kent; Kent State University Salem; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity-constrained firms. Under two popular definitions of the uniform price, when each firm sets a price-quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. Even when firms may set bids th...
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作者：Inderst, Roman; Klein, Manuel
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We analyze how two key managerial tasks interact: that of growing the business through creating new investment opportunities and that of providing accurate information about these opportunities in the corporate budgeting process. We show how this interaction endogenously biases managers toward overinvesting in their own projects. This bias is exacerbated if managers compete for limited resources in an internal capital market, which provides us with a novel theory of the boundaries of the firm....
