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作者：Deneckere, Raymond; Liang, Meng-Yu
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：This article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a durable good that depreciates stochastically over time. We show that there exist three types of stationary equilibria: a Coase Conjecture equilibrium, a monopoly equilibrium, and a reputational equilibrium. When the depreciation rate is low, the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. For intermediate values of the depreciation rate, all three equilibrium types coexist. When the depreciation rate is high, the mo...
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作者：Auriol, Emmanuelle; Renault, Regis
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：This article introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. This is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status be decreased. Higher-status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money; better-paid agents would exert higher effort in exchange for improved status. The results are consistent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long-term work relatio...
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil; Baliga, Sandeep; Besanko, David
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Psychological and experimental evidence, as well as a wealth of anecdotal examples, suggests that firms may confound fixed, sunk, and variable costs, leading to distorted pricing decisions. This article investigates the extent to which market forces and learning eventually eliminate these distortions. We envision firms that experiment with cost methodologies that are consistent with real-world accounting practices, including ones that confuse the relevance of variable, fixed, and sunk costs to...
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作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among firms producing horizontally and vertically differentiated substitute products. Incomplete information about vertical quality (consumer satisfaction) signalled via price softens price competition. Low-quality firms always prefer the incomplete information game to the full-information analog. Moreover, for high-value markets with a sufficiently high proportion of high-quality f...
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作者：Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：The article addresses the issue of optimal organization of production. I compare three organizational forms: centralization (one agent produces different inputs), decentralization (each of two agents produces a different input and contracts directly with the principal), and delegation (two agents produce different inputs, the principal contracts with one of them only). The optimal organizational form depends on the degree of complementarity/substitutability between the inputs in the final use....
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作者：de Frutos, Maria-Angeles; Kittsteiner, Thomas
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Buy-sell clauses are commonly used contractual provisions to determine the terms of dissolution of partnerships. Under them, one party offers a price for the partnership and the other party chooses whether to sell her share or buy her partner's share at this price. We point out that the selection of the proposing partner is essential for the performance of the clause. Moreover, if partners negotiate for the advantage of being the chooser, then buy-sell clauses result in an ex post efficient ou...
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作者：Yehezkel, Yaron
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：This article considers vertical relations between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer that can independently obtain a low-quality, discount substitute. The analysis reveals that under full information, the retailer offers both varieties if and only if it is optimal to do so under vertical integration. However, when the retailer is privately informed about demand, it offers both varieties even if under vertical integration it is profitable to offer only the manufacturer's product...
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作者：Hortacsu, Ali; Puller, Steven L.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We examine the bidding behavior of firms in the Texas electricity spot market, where bidders submit hourly supply schedules to sell power. We characterize an equilibrium model of bidding and use detailed firm-level data on bids and marginal costs to compare actual bidding behavior to theoretical benchmarks. Firms with large stakes in the market performed close to the theoretical benchmark of static profit maximization. However, smaller firms utilized excessively steep bid schedules significant...
