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作者：Chakravarty, Surajeet; MacLeod, W. Bentley
作者单位：University of Exeter; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations based on verifiable events (corresponding to the legal rule of specific performance). As a matter of law, this is not the case. This leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies used by the courts. This article shows that American standard form construction contracts can be viewed as an efficient mechanism for implementing building projects given existing legal rules. It is shown th...
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作者：Hazlett, Thomas W.; Munoz, Roberto E.
作者单位：George Mason University; Universidad Tecnica Federico Santa Maria
摘要：Economic analysis of spectrum policy focuses on government revenues derived via competitive bidding for licenses. Auctions generating high bids are identified as successful and those with lower receipts as fiascoes. Yet spectrum policies that create rents impose social costs. Most obviously, rules favoring monopoly predictably increase license values but reduce welfare. This article attempts to shift analytical focus to efficiency in output markets. In performance metrics derived by comparing ...
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作者：Galeotti, Andrea; Goyal, Sanjeev
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Cambridge
摘要：The growth of the Internet and assorted technologies has made it possible to collect and process detailed information on social networks. This article investigates how firms (and governments) can harness the power of social networks to promote their goals. We show that the optimal use of social networks leads to higher sales and greater profits. However, an increase in the level and dispersion of social interaction can increase or decrease the optimal influence strategy and profits of the play...
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作者：Anderson, Simon P.; Renault, Regis
作者单位：University of Virginia; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：Improved consumer information about horizontal aspects of products of similar quality leads to better consumer matching but also to higher prices, so consumer surplus can go up or down, while profits rise. With enough quality asymmetry, though, the higher-quality (and hence larger) firm's price falls with more information, so both effects benefit consumers. This occurs when comparative advertising is used against a large firm by a small one. Comparative advertising, as it imparts more informat...
